FRACTIONAL FLOW

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The Price of Oil

Crude oil is the world’s biggest and most important traded commodity.

Figure 1: The chart shows the oil price (Brent) with some policies/decisions/events. The monetary and fiscal policies of the world’s largest economies, China [red text boxes] and the US [yellow text boxes] and supply events/policies [grey text boxes]. The red line shows the annual moving average of the oil price.

In some earlier articles, like this and this, I explored for relations between the oil price, the world’s credit creation and interest rates.

This is a continuation of my exploration of how the world’s credit creation affects the structural level of the oil price.

I found it now right to repeat one of my formulations from back in 2015:

  • Any forecasts of oil (and gas) demand/supplies and oil price trajectories are NOT very helpful if they do not incorporate forecasts for changes to total world credit/debt, interest rates and developments to consumers’/societies’ affordability.

As time passes more is learned and more data becomes available which in theory should help improve both the understandings and the sights.

This article presents results from applying statistical analysis (with data spanning more than 15 years) for any relations from developments in total credit/debt from the non financial sectors in 43 countries (in 2017 representing more than 90% of the worlds’s GDP) with data from the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) to changes in the oil price, refer also “Some assumptions, terms and acronyms used in the article” at the bottom.

Developments in total credit/debt is very much related to developments in interest rates, primarily the US Federal Reserve Bank’s (FRB) funds rate (as the US dollar is the world’s dominant reserve currency) which now is expected to be set higher, the London Inter Bank Offered Rate (LIBOR) and the US Treasuries 10 Years rate. A keen eye should also be kept on developments on the now flattening yield curve and exchange rate fluctuations.

It is also important to make good assessments about the abilities to the various balance sheets to take on and service more debt. This helps monitor developments in consumers’ affordability which forms the demand side of the equation.

  • The structural oil price is formulated from the interactions of fiscal and monetary policies and supply events/policies.
  • The oil price has shown and will continue to show wide fluctuations. It is the monetary and fiscal policies that give the dominant structural support for demand and thus the oil price (defines the price movements).
  • Suppliers have little control on demand, but could resort to supply policies to support a price floor.
    The price collapse in 2014 was a result of strong growth in supplies, primarily led by debt fueled US Light Tight Oil (LTO) extraction.
  • The strengthening of the US$ (oil is priced in US$) has now resulted in very high oil prices in local currencies, refer also table 1.
  • Broadly speaking, it now appears that the world’s non financial sector needs to add $8 – $10 Trillion annually in credit/debt to support growth in the oil price, refer also figure 8.
    Estimates based on data from the Institute of International Finance (IIF) and BIS show that in Q1 2018 the world’s total non financial debt was $188 Trillion with another $61 Trillion in the financial corporations, totaling $249 Trillion.
  • Since 2000 there has been 3 distinct credit/debt cycles for the 43 (refer also figure 7 and 8).
    The first ended in mid 2008 with the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) (duration about 7 years).
    The second ended with the collapse in the oil price in mid 2014 (duration about 5 years).
    The third started about mid 2015 and, as of writing, could be entering its fourth year.
  • The analysis found strongest correlation (above 0,72) between changes to the 43s total private and public credit/debt creation and changes in the oil price at a time lag of 3 months, refer also figure 10.
    • Why this matters? If the world’s credit/debt growth supports the oil price, a slowdown or reversal of the world’s credit/debt creation (deleveraging) should be expected to affect the oil (and energy) prices negatively.
      The results of the statistical analysis show there is an expected time lag of about 3 months from major changes in the world’s credit creation (leading indicator) to changes in the oil price. The correlations were strong with a time lag of 0 – 6 months from changes in the credit creation to changes in the oil price.
      The supply surplus starting in 2014, which collapsed the oil price, appears to be the driver for a period with lower credit creation, which suggest that the lowered oil price temporarily lowered the world’s demand for credit.
  • Changes in credit creation are the strong leading driver of changes in the oil price.
  • A simple illustration of the perspectives of the relations of the oil price, interest rate and total debt is now to look at how much the oil price has to grow to have similar effects on the world economy as an increase in the interest rate of 0,25% on the worlds’ total debt of about $250 Trillion, which continues to grow.
    An increase of the interest rate of 0,25 % adds $625 Billion to the world’s annual debt service costs. The world now consumes about 30 Gbo/a (crude oil and condensate) which means that an increase in the oil price of $20/bo has about similar effects on the world economy as an interest rate hike of 0,25%. Some major central banks, led by FRB, now plan for more interest hikes and Quantitative Tightening (QT) in the near future.
  • The above serves as a powerful illustration of the growing competition for how the consumers’ available funds will be prioritized between servicing growing debts or supporting a higher oil price.
    Historically, precedence was given to debt service and consumers reduced other (including oil) consumption.

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Written by Rune Likvern

Tuesday, 21 August, 2018 at 14:34

Status of Norwegian Natural Gas at end of 2015 and Forecasts towards 2025

In this post I present actual Norwegian natural gas production, status on reserves, the development in discoveries and what this results for Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (NPD) and my expectations for the future delivery potential for Norwegian natural gas.

Norway, after Russia, has been and is the EU’s second biggest supplier of natural gas.

Norway is the third largest gas exporter in the world. In 2015, Norway exported about 114 Gcm (Bcm) gas, mainly to other countries in Europe.

Included is also a brief look at developments in actual consumption and production of natural gas in the 28 members of the European Union (the EU 28).

  • NPD in their most recent forecast further revised down and narrowed their band for future delivery potential with about 10 Gcm/a (Bcm/a) by 2025 and pushed forward the start of decline one year relative to their previous forecast.
  • I now expect the Norwegian delivery potential for natural gas relative to 2015 to decline by more than 40% by 2025.
  • Europe will increasingly have to rely on natural gas imports from more distant sources and should by now have defined policies for the role natural gas will have in its future energy mix.

This post is an update to my post in 2015 looking at the status as of end 2014.

Figure 1: The chart above shows development in natural gas exports from production installations on the Norwegian Continental Shelf (NCS) as reported by the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (NPD) from 1996 to 2015 and with my forecast for delivery potential towards 2025. The chart also shows the band of NPD forecasts; green line upper projection, orange line lower projection. NPD’s central projection is in about the middle of the green and orange lines. The black dotted line is the forecast from the International Energy Agency’s World Energy Outlook 2012 (IEA WEO 2012). Numbers are believed to be gross exports from the production installations and thus not adjusted for “shrinkage” from Natural Gas Liquids (NGL) extraction, primarily at Kollsnes and Kårstø. The NGL extraction reduces total sales gas volumes with around 4% relative to what is exported from the producing installations. Numbers in Gcm, Giga cubic meters (Gcm = Bcm; Billion cubic meters)

Figure 1: The chart above shows development in natural gas exports from production installations on the Norwegian Continental Shelf (NCS) as reported by the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (NPD) from 1996 to 2015 and with my forecast for delivery potential towards 2025.
The chart also shows the band of NPD forecasts; green line upper projection, orange line lower projection. NPD’s central projection is in about the middle of the green and orange lines.
The black dotted line is the forecast from the International Energy Agency’s World Energy Outlook 2012 (IEA WEO 2012).
Numbers are believed to be gross exports from the production installations and thus not adjusted for “shrinkage” from Natural Gas Liquids (NGL) extraction, primarily at Kollsnes and Kårstø. The NGL extraction reduces total sales gas volumes with around 4% relative to what is exported from the producing installations.
Numbers in Gcm, Giga cubic meters (Gcm = Bcm; Billion cubic meters)

My forecast  and NPD’s forecast at end 2015 are basically identical towards the end of this decade, but differs about the timing for the start of the decline and how steep this will become as from early next decade. My forecast is also tested versus the Reserves over Production (R/P) ratio as of end 2015, refer also figure 2.

At end 2015 the NPD projection of Norwegian natural gas supply potential towards 2025 was revised down.

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Status of Norwegian Natural Gas at end of 2014 and Forecasts towards 2025

In this post I present actual Norwegian natural gas production, status on reserves, the development in discoveries and what this results for Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (NPD) and my expectations for the future delivery potential for Norwegian natural gas.

Norway, after Russia, has been and is the EU’s second biggest supplier of natural gas.

Included is also a brief look at developments in actual consumption and production of natural gas in the EU 28 (the 28 members of the European Union).

  • NPD revised down their band for future delivery potential by about 10 Gcm/a (Bcm/a) and moved the start of decline one year forward relative to their forecast last year.
  • I now expect the Norwegian delivery potential for natural gas relative to 2014/2015 to decline by more than 40% by 2025.
  • Europe will increasingly have to rely on natural gas imports from more distant sources and should by now have implemented policies for the role natural gas will have in its future energy mix.

This post is an update to my post in 2014 looking at the status as of end 2013.

Figure 1: The chart above shows development in natural gas exports from production installations on the Norwegian Continental Shelf (NCS) as reported by the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (NPD) from 1996 to 2014 and with my forecast for delivery potential towards 2025. The chart also shows the NPD forecasts; green line upper projection, orange line lower projection. NPD’s central projection is in about the middle of the green and orange lines. The black dotted line is the forecast from the International Energy Agency’s World Energy Outlook 2012 (IEA WEO 2012). Numbers are believed to be gross exports from the production installations and thus not adjusted for “shrinkage” from Natural Gas Liquids (NGL) extraction, primarily at Kollsnes and Kårstø. The NGL extraction reduces total sales gas volumes with around 4% relative to what is exported from the producing installations. Numbers in Gcm, Giga cubic meters (Gcm = Bcm; Billion cubic meters)

Figure 1: The chart above shows development in natural gas exports from production installations on the Norwegian Continental Shelf (NCS) as reported by the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (NPD) from 1996 to 2014 and with my forecast for delivery potential towards 2025.
The chart also shows the NPD forecasts; green line upper projection, orange line lower projection. NPD’s central projection is in about the middle of the green and orange lines.
The black dotted line is the forecast from the International Energy Agency’s World Energy Outlook 2012 (IEA WEO 2012).
Numbers are believed to be gross exports from the production installations and thus not adjusted for “shrinkage” from Natural Gas Liquids (NGL) extraction, primarily at Kollsnes and Kårstø. The NGL extraction reduces total sales gas volumes with around 4% relative to what is exported from the producing installations.
Numbers in Gcm, Giga cubic meters (Gcm = Bcm; Billion cubic meters)

My forecast  and NPD’s forecast at end 2014 are basically identical towards the end of this decade, but differs about the timing for the start of the decline and how steep this will become as from early next decade. My forecast is also tested versus the Reserves over Production (R/P) ratio as of end 2014, refer also figure 2.

At end 2014 the NPD projection of Norwegian natural gas supply potential towards 2025 was revised down.

NPD’s central projection is in about the middle of the green and orange lines. Note the span of uncertainties in the NPD’s forecast.

Read the rest of this entry »

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